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abstract
average intelligent patients with autism spectrum disorders (aSd) and patients with personality disorders (pd) 
are expected to show different problems in social cognition. consequently, measuring social cognition may contribute 
to a better understanding and differentiation of aSd and pd. therefore, we explored social cognition in these patient 
groups. tests included the mayer-Salovey-caruso-emotional-intelligence-test (mSceit) and emotional-Quotient-
inventory (eQ-i). analyses indicate that the aSd patients estimate themselves as more impaired on the ability to read 
emotions, but better on intrapersonal functioning, than the pd patients. in addition, both patient groups show more 
social cognitive impairment as compared to age and sex matched non-patient data. this holds true both for the self-
report measure and part of an ability measure. Further research involving a dimensional approach and detailed profiling 
of strengths and weaknesses is advised to gain better understanding of the specificity and intensity of impairments, and 
of further differences between these disorders.
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autism spectrum disorders (aSd) and personality 
disorders (pd) are psychiatric diagnoses that can be 
difficult to differentiate in clinical practice, particularly 
when observing overt behaviour in patients with average 
(or higher) intelligence quotients (fitzgerald 1999, 
horwitz et al. 2004, lehnhardt et al. 2013, lugnegard et 
al. 2011, Kumbier et al. 2009). lugnegard et al. (2011) 
studied 54 adults with an autism spectrum disorder, 
and half of them also reached criteria for a personality 
disorder. Both patients with aSd and patients with 
pd show pervasive problems in interpersonal -social- 
behaviour and affective areas (e.g.;  egger et al. 
2005, esterberg et al. 2008, frith 2003, horwitz et 
al. 2004, hurst et al. 2007, lugnegard et al. 2011, 
Widiger et al. 2009). horwitz et al. (2004) focussed 
on the phenomenological overlap between aSd and 
pd and mentioned social withdrawal behaviour as a 
resemblance between aSd and schizoid/schizotypal 
pd, impairments in empathic abilities as a resemblance 
between aSd and antisocial and narcissistic pd and 
problems in social interaction and inflexibility as a 
resemblance between aSd and respectively avoidant 
and obsessive compulsive pd. lehnhardt et al. more 
recently also focused on these overlapping problems 
(2013), which complicate differential diagnosis and 
offer the challenge for the present study. 
The leading diagnostic classification systems, 
based on primarily behavioural symptoms, do not 
sufficiently contribute to this differential diagnostics 
dilemma; these systems rather confirm the behavioural 
overlap in symptoms instead of shedding light on 
underlying impairments. it accentuates the mentioned 
clinical practice dilemma of differential diagnostics for 
disorders like aSd and pd, which becomes markedly 
visible when it concerns patient groups with an average 
intelligence quotient. the variety in patients with aSd, 
and the variety in patients with pd make it heterogeneous 
patient groups. in order to be able to compare these 
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presence of a (cognitive) negativity bias and/or sad 
emotion influences the way in which contextual (social) 
information is perceived (primarily giving attention to 
negative contextual information instead of to neutral 
or positive information), and this in turn influences 
and regulates one’s planning, decision-making and 
behavioural actions as well (izard 2009, Vaish et al. 
2008). Social cognition is involved in human empathy 
(the experiential understanding of other’s intentions 
and emotions) and is fundamentally needed to control 
affect, drive and motivation.  elaborating on all of this, 
social cognition forms the basis to come to adjusted 
(social) behaviour (decety 2010, Johnson et al. 2003). 
this makes social cognition a relevant research 
topic, when having differential diagnostics dilemmas 
concerning deviant social behaviour. 
Social cognition has earlier been a focus of studies 
concerning various neurodegenerative disorders 
and schizophrenia. Social withdrawal behaviour, 
problems in emotion recognition and theory of 
mind impairments (the ability to attribute intentions, 
thoughts and/or emotions to others, and thereby 
understanding situations from perspectives other than 
one’s own (premack and Woodruff 1978) are profound 
characteristics of aSd (e.g. apa 1994, Bonshtein et al. 
2006, couture et al. 2010, eack et al. 2010, edwards 
et al. 2002, lough and hodges 2002, piskulic et al. 
2010). furthermore, impairments in empathy, face 
processing, social attribution, affective contact and 
affect regulation are common in aSd (e.g., atkinson 
2009, Baron-cohen et al. 1997, Baron-cohen and 
Wheelwright 2004, domes et al. 2008, grossman et 
al. 2000, review of hill and frith 2003, Kanner 1943, 
Konstantareas and Steward 2006). Whereas disorders 
like schizophrenia and aSd have been compared 
(pinkham et al. 2008), studies performed on pd do not 
have a rich history of searching for correlations with 
neuropsychiatric disorders like aSd (horwitz et al. 
2004, lehnhardt et al. 2013). however, the clinically 
experienced difficulties to differentiate ASD and PD 
offer a relevant challenge to test the justification of this 
lack of research. the history of studies involving social 
cognition and pd shows a tendency to link Borderline 
pd with social cognitive problems like disturbed 
recognition of emotions, thoughts and intentions 
in others (e.g., fonagy et al. 2003, Kernberg 1996, 
Preiβler et al. 2010, Westen 1991). The anti-social and 
schizotypical pd were associated with facial emotion 
recognition impairments (e.g., Brown and cohen 2010, 
marsh and Blair 2007). the ability for theory of mind 
was, as far as studied, not impaired for patients with 
Borderline pd and for patients with a more avoidant/
withdrawing pd (arntz et al. 2009, franzen et al. 
2011). patients with Borderline pd do tend to show a 
negativity/anger bias, and a heightened sensitivity to the 
detection of (particular facial expressions of) negative 
emotions (domes et al. 2009, lynch et al. 2006). With 
respect to the regulative side of the social cognitive 
process, Borderline pd has been linked to impairments 
in emotion regulation (e.g., dijke et al. 2010, Johnson et 
al. 2003). Blair (2008) combined aSd and psychopathy 
because of overlapping empathic impairments in 
his study, and linked psychopathy to impairments in 
emotional empathy and autism to problems in cognitive 
empathy (theory of mind). 
as described above, social cognitive impairments 
have been shown in both pd and aSd; problems in 
pd seem to be linked to the emotionalising part of the 
social cognitive process, whereas for aSd, both the 
cognitive and emotionalising part of the process are 
shown to be impaired. however, to our best knowledge, 
groups, we matched for intelligence and age, and sex 
was a covariate. for aSd, typical diagnostic practice 
involves amnestic and hetero-anamnestic information 
concerning one’s (problem) behaviour in past and 
present, for which an interview based on aSd criteria 
can be used and neurocognitive (e.g. social emotional) 
test measures can be taken along with self-report 
questionnaires concerning aSd criteria. however, 
to date, there is no ideal test-protocol (nederlandse 
Vereniging voor psychiatrie/nederlands instituut van 
psychologen 2013). most of the patients involved in 
the present study and diagnosed with aSd got their 
classification after several of these diagnostic steps were 
taken. for pd, common diagnostic practice involves 
amnestic information concerning one’s present problem 
behaviour, for which a questionnaire and interview based 
on dSm-iV criteria (e.g. Structured clinical interview for 
dSm-iV disorders) can be used (landelijke Stuurgroep 
voor multidisciplinaire richtlijnontwikkeling in de ggZ 
2008, Weertman et al. 2000).
the brain-behaviour model illustrates how neurobi-
ology (genes, brain) pairs with overt behaviour via neu-
rocognitive functions like attention, social cognition, 
memory, language and planning. neurocognitive func-
tions typically concern the ability to process informa-
tion (perception, recognition, evaluation of stimuli), and 
direct behaviour (Kandel et al. 2013). they form one of 
the measurable links between surface behaviour and the 
brain. although neurocognitive function as measured 
in the present study does not involve bio-physiological 
measures like eeg/mri, it does get under the surface 
of overt behaviour. evolving from this, knowledge of 
neurocognitive functioning in disorders like aSd and 
pd is thought to lead to a better understanding of the 
pervasive (behavioural) problems in, and differentia-
tion between these disorders, thereby dealing with the 
earlier mentioned clinical practice dilemma. the overt 
behavioural perspective involves observations that one 
is not making eye contact, whereas the “neurocogni-
tive” perspective takes a check under the surface, look-
ing for the key issues that impair the eye contact (for 
example, shyness, an inability to read minds or signs 
of visual impairment). Both perspectives are essentially 
useful, but when one wants to achieve adequate social 
behavioural change (like improvement of eye contact), 
the neurocognitive check under the surface is needed to 
identify the key impairments on which indications for 
treatment can be based (e.g. glasses, training of facial 
emotion recognition and/or therapeutically improving 
one’s self-confidence and assertiveness in social inter-
actions). looking back at the clinical practice dilemma, 
especially when an average intelligent person with aSd 
and a person with pd show primary problems in social 
interaction, whereas other problems are thought to be 
less prominently present (e.g. problems in communica-
tion and impulse control), the differentiation between 
the disorders can be most difficult. The primary neu-
rocognitive function that underlies interpersonal func-
tioning is social cognition. 
Social cognition broadly represents the integrated 
processing of socio-emotional information, needed 
to direct interaction, thereby underlying adaptive 
social behaviour (Swaab et al. 2011). it involves the 
perception of others (e.g. body signs, facial expressions, 
intentions), the perception of self (e.g. own thoughts 
and emotions) and interpersonal knowledge needed to 
manage tasks and self-regulate daily life. thoughts and 
emotion play an influencing role in both the processing 
of the incoming information and in the behavioural 
output (adolphs 2001, 2006 and 2009, Beer and 
ochsner 2006, Swaab et al. 2011). for instance, the 
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of own functioning on self-report scales, as compared 
to estimations by their family context; that is, no contra-
indications seem to be present for using self-report 
measures in this group (ozonoff et al. 2005).
in the stating of hypotheses, a difference is made 
between these self-report and ability measures. put 
shortly, with respect to ability, we hypothesize that: (a) 
patients with aSd perform lower (more impaired) on 
the ability to read intentions and emotions, than patients 
with pd. With respect to self-report, we hypothesize 
that: (b) patients with pd estimate themselves as 
more impaired on the ability to read emotions and 
intrapersonal functioning, than patients with aSd. With 
respect to both self-report and ability, we hypothesize 
that: (c) Both patients with aSd and patients with 
pd estimate themselves as more impaired on aspects 
of social cognition, and actually have a lower ability 
on these aspects, than non-patients (control data). for 
the pd patients, the accent of impairments is expected 
on the emotionalising part of social cognition. Within 
the aSd and the pd groups, differences between 
diagnostic subgroups will be studied in an explorative 
style because of smaller n sizes (lower power). 
method
Participants
participants consisted of 51 patients diagnosed with 
an aSd (aSd group) and 68 patients diagnosed with a 
pd (pd group). the aSd group consisted of 46 males 
and 5 females in the age of 19 to 62 years (m=35.04, 
Sd=13.5). the pd group consisted of 22 males and 46 
females in the age of 15 to 65 years (m=35.88, Sd=13.7). 
evaluated by lezak’s model of normal distribution, both 
groups had an average intelligence Quotient (iQ) (aSd 
group m=93.8, Sd=8.3; pd group m=93.9, Sd=13.0); 
the inclusion threshold for IQ was set on ≥ 70. For the 
aSd group, the diagnoses were: 2 autistic disorder, 18 
asperger’s disorder and 31 pervasive developmental 
Disorder Not Otherwise Specified (PDD-NOS).  For 
the pd group, the cluster of the primary personality 
disorder diagnosis was determined (also for the not 
Otherwise Specified group): 1 cluster A, 35 cluster B, 
32 cluster c. all patients were treated at the Vincent van 
gogh institute for mental health care. non-patient data 
for eQ-i and mSceit tests were derived from pen 
psycho-diagnostics (Bögels 2010) and matched with 
both the aSd and pd group, for age and sex (no iQ 
data present). for the aSd group, non-patient controls 
for eQ-i ratings were 47 males and 5 females, mean 
age 35.65 (Sd 8.91). for the mSceit ratings non-
patient controls for the aSd group were 47 males and 5 
females, mean age 35.54 (Sd 11.52). for the pd group, 
groups of patients with aSd and pd have hardly ever 
been compared in one study involving the same tasks 
and conditions. 
the aim of our present study is to contribute to the 
understanding and differentiation of aSd and pd, by 
mapping several aspects of social cognition, thereby 
studying parts of the phenomenological overlap between 
aSd and pd that complicate differential diagnostics in 
clinical practice. Studying the described neurocognitive 
chain of perceptive, emotional and executive processes 
that eventually result in social behaviour will give 
relevant information about the nature and intensity 
of the core problems in aSd and pd. it can thereby 
contribute to clarification of the mentioned differential 
diagnostics dilemma. furthermore, we expect that this 
neurocognitive perspective on pathology can contribute 
to tailored psychological assessment and basic treatment 
indications to promote adjusted (self-regulative) 
daily life participation, by focusing on strengths and 
weaknesses in the functional drive of behaviour rather 
than solely on overt observations. 
the main question in this study is: do patients with 
aSd and patients with pd function differently on 
aspects of social cognition? if this question results in a 
confirmation, the measurement of social cognition with 
chosen measures (see below) can validly differentiate 
in the phenomenological overlap between aSd and pd, 
contributing to the earlier mentioned clinical practice 
dilemma. an aSd and pd group will be compared on 
both self-report and ability measures of social cognition 
(aspects like theory of mind, emotion recognition and 
ability to regulate emotions). the emotional Quotient-
inventory (eQ-i), the mayer-Salovey-caruso emotional 
intelligence test (mSceit), the Bermond-Vorst 
alexithymia Questionaire (BVaQ) and the Strange 
Stories task (SSt) are used to assess the various aspects 
of the social cognition process. for part of the data, the 
groups are also compared with data from non-patients. 
given the described social cognitive problems in 
aSd, impairments can be expected on the ability to read 
intentions and emotions (e.g., atkinson 2009, Baron-
cohen et al. 1997, Baron-cohen and Wheelwright 
2004, domes et al. 2008, grossman et al. 2000, review 
of hill and frith 2003, Kanner 1943, Konstantareas 
and Steward 2006). for the pd group, because of their 
negativity bias in perceiving self and others, patients can 
be expected to estimate themselves as more impaired 
on reading emotions and intrapersonal functioning. 
patients with pd are expected to show more impairment 
on the emotionalising part of social cognition (e.g., 
Brown and cohen 2010, domes et al. 2009, lynch et 
al. 2006). aspects of social cognition can be measured 
by self-report and ability measures. patients with aSd 
have been shown to be able to give a realistic estimation 
 
Figure 1. Social cognitive model (Adolphs 2001)
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true or true of me”. Scores are provided and adjusted 
to standard scores for total eQ, 5 eQ composite scales, 
15 eQ content scales and 4 Validity indicators (Bar-on 
1997). the mean standard score is 100 (Sd=15) (dawda 
and hart 2000). the 5 eQ composite scales include 
intrapersonal functioning (content scales emotional self-
awareness, assertiveness, self-regard, self-actualization, 
independence), interpersonal functioning (content 
scales empathy, social responsibility, interpersonal 
relationships), adaptation (content scales reality testing, 
flexibility, problem solving), Stress management (content 
scales stress tolerance, impulse-control), and general 
mood aspects (content scales optimism, happiness). 
higher scores generally indicate a self-estimate of more 
adequate functioning, although scores high above average 
can be inadequate as well (for example, over social 
responsible behaviour). dutch norms were provided by 
the catholic university Brabant (nederlands instituut 
voor psychologen nip 2005). test-retest reliabilities 
of .73 and .78 were mentioned by Brackett and mayer 
(2003). Bar-on described positive validity results (2005). 
Strange stories task (SST)
the SSt (happe 1994, Spek et al. 2010) consists of 
short stories. it assesses participant’s ability to attribute 
mental states to others, by stories featuring a pretend 
event, a joke, a lie, a white lie, a figure of speech, and 
bluffing. After the participant’s basic understanding of the 
story is assessed, an open-ended question is presented to 
assess the participant’s understanding of the character’s 
mental state. the score is derived from the total number 
of physical instead of mental state responses and the total 
number of wrong responses in understanding the stories. 
the SSt has positive reliability and validity results on 
measuring theory of mind as part of social cognition 
in children (Kaland et al. 2002). a non-patient group 
made very few faults on the SSt; n= 32, m failure score 
= .69, Sd 1.09 (Spek et al. 2010). the strange stories 
task that was used in the present study, was translated 
by forward-backward procedure in dutch by Spek et al. 
(2010). it contains eight stories, derived from happé her 
original task (1994) as being the most difficult for adults. 
Stories were scored by a second rater, and the degree of 
concordance was 97 % for the ‘correct answer score’ and 
95 % for the ‘mental explanation score’. 
Bermond-Vorst Alexithymia Questionaire 
(BVAQ) 
the BVaQ (Bermond and Vorst 2001) is a 40-item 
self-report measure, which comprises two parallel 
versions each of 20 items. Each item is rated on a five-
point likert scale, ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 
5 (strongly disagree). The five factors indicating the 
recognition and regulation of one’s own emotions 
(alexithymia is the deficit in doing this) are: verbalizing 
(self-reported ability to describe and communicate 
own emotional states), fantasizing (self-reported ability 
to fantasize, imagine, day dream), identifying (self-
reported ability to define reasons for being aroused), 
emotionalizing (self-reported ability to experience 
emotional arousal with emotion triggering events) 
and analysing (self-reported tendency to seek out own 
emotional reactions (Bermond and Vorst 2001). for 
each factor, high scores are indicative of alexithymia. 
psychometric properties of the BVaQ have shown to be 
sufficient; reliability ranges from .67 to .87 for subscales 
and validity was in an acceptable range (müller et al. 
2004, Vorst and Bermond, 2001).
in a study of Berthoz and hill (2005) on aSd 
and alexithymia, patients were able to reflect on their 
emotions in an emotionalizing and fantasizing way, but 
less in a cognitive way (verbalizing, identifying and 
analyzing). 
non-patients control data for the eQ-i were derived 
from 20 males and 34 females, mean age 36.24 (Sd 
9.90). for the mSceit non-patient control data for the 
pd group were scores from 22 males and 43 females, 
mean age 36.20 (Sd 11.98).
Materials
Social cognition measures consisted of the mayer-
Salovey-caruso emotional intelligence test (mSceit; 
mayer et al. 2003), the emotional Quotient inventory 
(eQ-i; Bar-on 1997), the Strange Stories task (SSt; 
happe 1994) and the Bermond-Vorst alexithymia 
Questionaire (BVaQ; Bermond and Vorst, 1996).  an iQ 
test was performed as a check and for the use as covariate 
(see procedure).
Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence 
Test (MSCEIT)
the mSceit is an ability measure of social 
cognition, involving emotional processing. it assesses 
branches: emotion perception (ability to recognise 
how one and others feel; task with pictures of facial 
expressions), understanding (knowledge and reasoning 
about complex emotions and the way emotions unfold), 
facilitation (ability to generate and reason with emotion) 
and regulation of emotion (management of emotion in 
oneself and others).
these branch descriptions clearly show overlap 
with aspects of the earlier mentioned social cognition 
definition (integrated processing of socio-emotional 
information needed to direct interaction; Swaab et al. 
2011). the mSceit consists of 141 items across 8 tasks; 
two tasks comprise each of the 4 mentioned branch scores 
in the mayer and Salovey 4-factor model of emotional 
intelligence. two area scores are derived from the model; 
the experiential ability (being able to perceive, experience 
and reason with emotionally laden information) and the 
strategic ability (being able to understand emotionally 
laden information and manage emotions). total, subscale 
and individual items are scored through a web-based 
scoring program (multi-health Systems, inc, canada), 
using unadjusted consensus norms from a large normative 
sample, where participants receive a score based on the 
proportion of individuals in the normative sample that 
endorse their response to a particular question. total 
and branch scores are automatically calculated and 
scaled with a mean of 100 (Sd=15), with higher scores 
reflecting better emotional intelligence (Eack et al. 2010, 
mayer et al. 2003). in psychometric properties studies 
which were described by Brackatt and Salovey in 2006, 
the mSceit showed a full-test split-half reliability of 
.93 for consensus scoring (which is used for the present 
study), area scores reliabilities were .90 and .90 and 
branch score reliabilities were between .76 and .91.  test-
retest reliability of the full-test mSceit over a three-
week interval was r(59)= .86 in a college student sample. 
Satisfying  factor-structure is present and the mSceit 
showed content and structurally validity as well as 
discriminant, convergent, predictive, and incremental 
validity. Sex and age corrections were applied for 
the aSd and pd group comparisons (primarily to 
compensate for the sex differences between the groups). 
for the matched control data, only raw composite scores 
were present; they were compared with those for the 
aSd and pd groups. 
The Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-i)
the eQ-i is a self-report measure of social cognition 
aspects like emotional intelligence. it consists of 133 
items, with a response rating scale (5-point), ranging 
from “very seldom true or not true of me” to “very often 
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(including management of emotions)” (both mSceit) 
and the “total failures SSt” loaded highest, the latter in 
negative direction. the explained variance was 13.06 
%. B) Self-estimate of ability to read emotions, linking 
with hypothesis b, focusing on self-estimate; the scale 
“interpersonal functioning” (eQ-i) and the scales of 
verbalising, identifying, emotionalising and analysing 
of emotions (BVaQ) loaded highest, only interpersonal 
functioning in positive direction. the explained 
variance was 18.69%. c) Self-estimate of intrapersonal 
functioning, also linking with hypothesis b, focusing 
on self-estimate; “intrapersonal functioning”, “stress 
management”, “adaptation” and “mood” (eQ-i) loaded 
highest, all in positive direction. the explained variance 
was 28.72 %. d) Self-estimate of ability to fantasize; 
scale “fantasizing” (BVaQ) loading highest, in negative 
direction. the explained variance was 8.01 %. factor 
scale d was not taken into account for analyses due 
to the mentioned lower n for the BVaQ measure. 
hypothesis c, concerning both ability and self-report 
comparisons of aSd and pd groups with controls, links 
to both domain a, B and c.
(multivariate) analyses of covariance (mancoVa’s) 
were conducted to compare the aSd, pd group and 
controls (hypothesis c). mancoVa’s were only 
conducted with the factor variables (variables loading 
on a, B or c), for which basic assumptions of normality, 
homogeneity of variances, and linearity were met. if 
not, an ordinal regression (plum) was conducted. 
in all analyses, diagnosis was used as the between-
subject factor. in addition, iQ, sex and age were used 
as covariates for the aSd and pd group comparisons 
(for controls, no iQ data present). results that are not 
mentioned were non-significant. All Box M’s tests for 
equality of covariance matrices were non-significant. As 
mentioned, due to the 34 statistical tests that were done, 
the p-level was adjusted using a false discovery rate 
adjusted p-level of 0.01214 (narum 2006).
ordinal regression and (m)ancoVa analyses were 
conducted for both the aSd and the pd group with 
matched controls (sex, age) on the eQ-i and mSceit, 
linking with hypothesis c. Scores, available for analysis, 
were the raw composite scale scores for the eQ-i and 
raw branch scores for the mSceit. results showed that 
both the aSd and pd group are impaired on the strategic 
regulation of emotions, as compared to controls. in 
addition, both the aSd and pd group report worse 
functioning on ability to read emotions and intrapersonal 
functioning (eQ-i major scales intra, and interpersonal 
functioning, stress management, adaptation and general 
mood). See tables 1, 2 and 3 for descriptive statistics, 
group and covariate effects.
the univariate analysis for the comparison between 
aSd and pd on reading and regulating intentions 
and emotions (domain a, linking with hypothesis 
a, concerning ability comparison), with mSceit 
experiential area as dependent variable, showed no 
significant main effect for diagnosis, sex or age, but 
did reveal a main effect for iQ (higher iQ performing 
better). See table 4 for descriptive statistics and table 5 
for ancoVa.
the multivariate analysis, with (domain B, linking 
with hypothesis b, self-estimate comparison) self-
estimate of ability to read emotions-scales as dependent 
variables, showed (only) a significant main effect for 
diagnosis; the significant diagnosis effect was specifically 
visible on the interpersonal functioning-scale: the aSd 
group reporting worse functioning than the pd group. 
See table 4 for descriptive statistics and table 5 for 
mancoVa. the interpersonal functioning-scale is, 
as mentioned, a major eQ-i scale; when analysing the 
Procedure
participants were selected by administrative 
searches on diagnosis (aSd or pd) with as few as 
possible comorbid diagnoses (for example, diagnoses 
like schizophrenia and major affective disorders were 
excluded). to complete the described tasks, participants 
required two hours. diagnoses of participants (aSd 
or pd) were checked, using the longitudinal expert 
evaluation using all data (lead-method; Spitzer 1983): 
an expert diagnosed the patient by using information 
from multiple sources (patient, family, team as stated in 
patient file). The SCID-I and II screening questionnaires 
were also conducted for this purpose (groenestijn et 
al. 1999, Weertman et al. 2000). for aSd, during the 
lead-method, the presence of (hetero-) anamnestic 
information (focusing on aSd) was checked.  as a 
check and for the use as covariate, an iQ screening 
test, the dutch version of the national reading test for 
adults (nlV) was used; the threshold was put at 70.  
Statistical analyses
a comparative design with exploratory aspects 
was used for this study. to determine the domains of 
the instrument’s major subscales used in this study, a 
principal component analysis with oblique rotation 
was used, with the number of factors extracted, based 
on the scree plot. in order to contain relevancy and 
power of analyses, the major scales of test measures 
(13) were taken into the principal component analysis: 
the verbalising, fantasising, emotionalising, analysing 
and identifying scales of the BVaQ, the intrapersonal, 
interpersonal, stress management, adaptation and 
general mood scales of the eQ-i, the experiential and 
strategic area scales of the mSceit and the total failure 
score of the SSt. after data-reduction, (m)ancoVa’s 
were conducted for variables that met basic assumptions 
(normality, homogeneity of variances, linearity). 
ordinal regression (plum) analysis was conducted 
for factor-scales (part of factor domains a, B and c), 
not meeting these basic assumptions; the advantage of 
this analysis is that it enables accounting for covariates, 
contrary to mann-Whitney tests. the independent 
variable for most hypotheses was diagnosis (aSd, pd, 
non-patients). the dependent variables were the scores 
on specific subscales. Sex, age and IQ were used as 
covariates (iQ not for comparisons to non-patients, as 
we had no iQ estimates for them). means were adjusted 
to covariates. SpSS version 18.0 was used. missing 
values were present for 21 patients on part of the BVaQ 
due to a lacking page of items. for 1 patient the eQ-i 
was not present and for 1 patient the mSceit computer 
system failed for part of the scoring. cases with missing 
values were excluded on a pairwise basis, in order to 
be able to still analyse the remaining case data on other 
measures. as 34 statistical tests were done, the p-level 
was adjusted using a false discovery rate adjusted 
p-level of 0.01214 (narum 2006).
results
after doing a principal component analysis with 
oblique rotation (see method for variables taken into 
account), four “social cognition” factors were derived 
and the following categorization in factor scales was 
made. a) ability to read and regulate intentions and 
emotions, linking with hypothesis a, focusing on ability; 
the task scales “experiential ability”, “strategic ability 
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Table 2. Ordinal regression analysis with major scales of the EQ-i and MSCEIT, for the ASD comparison with controls
Dependent variables Diagnosis (ASD)
Estimate   Wald     p
Covariate sex
 Est    Wald     p
Covariate age    df=1
Est    Wald    p






-3.29         49.75     <.001*
-2.55         38.02     <.001*
-2.62         39.36     <.001*
-1.86         24.03     <.001*
-2.65         39.75     <.001*  
-.48     .65       .42
1.28    4.54     .03
-.90     2.27     .13
-1.46   5.81     .02
-.10     .03       .87
.01      .54       .46
.02      2.55     .11
.02      2.26     .13
.01      .86       .35
.02      2.57     .11
mSceit major area scales: 
emotional experiential 
emotional strategic
.08            .06          .81
-.86          6.16        .01*
 
.58      .96       .33
.56      .89       .35
.01      .17       .68
.002    .02       .89
Note: -* = Significant result; False Discovery Rate BY method, k = 34, p < .012. Es = effect size partial eta squared (due to the 34 statistical 
tests that were done, the p-level was adjusted using a False Discovery Rate adjusted p-level of 0.01214 (Narum, 2006))
-For normally distributed variables, (M)ANOVA’s were conducted, leading to the same (significant) results
Table 3. Ordinal regression analysis with major scales of the EQ-i and MSCEIT, for the PD comparison with controls
Dependent variables Diagnosis (PD)
Estimate   Wald     p
Covariate sex
 Est    Wald     p
Covariate age     df=1
Est    Wald    p





-4.47          68.11      <.001*
-2.27          34.82      <.001*      
-3.49          60.73      <.001*
-2.87          48.82      <.001*
-4.09          65.86      <.001*
-1.19    8.89     <.01*
.11       .08       .78
-1.74    18.08   <.001*
-1.92    21.09   <.001*
-.78      4.01     .05
.03     2.52     .11
.01     .19       .66
.02     .93       .34 
.01     .08       .77
.03     4.14     .04
mSceit major area scales:  emotional 
experiential emotional strategic -.22             .52              .47
-1.43          19.28      <.001*
 
.13       .13       .71
-.01      .001     .98
-.01    .52       .47
-.01    .63       .43
Note: 
-* = Significant result; False Discovery Rate BY method, k = 34, p < .012. Es = effect size partial eta squared (due to the 34 statistical tests 
that were done, the p-level was adjusted using a False Discovery Rate adjusted p-level of 0.01214 (Narum, 2006))
- For normally distributed variables, (M)ANOVA’s were conducted, leading to the same (significant) results
Table 1. Descriptive statistics variables, for the comparison of ASD and PD groups with controls on major 
scales EQ-i and MSCEIT
Dependent variables ASD                                 
Median     Quartiles        
Controls                        PD                              Controls    
Median     Quartiles     Median     Quartiles Median     Quartiles  






122.50        108.00-139.75
80.00          70.50-85.25
82.00          76.00-89.00
57.00          51.25-66.00 
58.00          46.25-64.75 
  163.00      151.25-171.00  104.50     89.25-115.50   158.00       141.50-173.5
  98.00        86.00-107.75     87.00      80.00-94.00     101.50       94.00-108.00  
  96.00        89.50-102.75     76.00      71.00-84.00     97.00         88.75-104.25
  67.00        62.00-73.00       52.00      43.00-58.25     64.50         57.75-71.25
  72.00        65.25-77.00       47.00      40.00-58.00     71.50         65.00-77.00
mSceit major area scales:  
emotional experiential 
emotional strategic
.48             .41-.53       
.43             .39-.47 
  .48            .40-.53                .47         .41-.52              .49            .41-.53
  .46            .42-.48                .43         .39-.46              .47            .45-.50
Note:
-For the controls data, available for analysis were the raw composite scale scores for the EQ-i and the raw branch scores for the MSCEIT. 
-In this table, for both normally and not-normally distributed variables the medians and quartiles are stated.
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ordinal regression (plum) analyses were conducted 
for scales not meeting basic assumptions. for the 
descriptive statistics and results of this analysis see table 
6 and 7. in domain a (linking with hypothesis a, ability 
comparison), ability to read and regulate intentions and 
emotions, significant effects were found for IQ and 
age on the strategic regulation of emotions, but not for 
diagnosis and sex. in domain B, self-estimate of ability 
to read emotions, no significant effects were present for 
diagnosis, age, iQ or sex. in domain c, self-estimate of 
intrapersonal functioning, the only significant effect was 
present for age on stress management; higher age related 
to report of lower management. 
mancoVa’s for scales meeting basic assumptions 
(part of domains a, B and c) and ordinal regression 
for scales not meeting basic assumptions, did yield no 
within group differences (differences between various 
aSd-diagnoses, and differences between various pd-
clusters). due to the low number, cluster a patients (n= 
1), were excluded.
significant effect further by looking at the content of this 
major scale, the empathy and interrelationships fit with 
this effect (f (1,87) = 16.2, p < .001 and f (1,87) = 5.2, p 
< 0.3); the aSd group reporting worse functioning than 
the pd group.
the multivariate analysis, with (domain c, also 
linking with hypothesis b, self-estimate comparison) 
self-estimate of intrapersonal functioning-scales as 
dependent variables, showed significant main effects 
for diagnosis and age, but not for sex and iQ. patients 
with aSd report better functioning than patients with 
PD, on intrapersonal functioning. A significant effect 
was found on the adaptation scale for age (lower age 
reporting better functioning). See table 4 for descriptive 
statistics and table 5 for mancoVa. the intrapersonal 
functioning is, as mentioned, part of the eQ-i; when 
analysing the significant effect further by looking at the 
subscales, the self-actualisation scale fits with this effect 
(f (1,109) = 8.7, p < .01), patients with aSd reporting 
better functioning. 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics & analyses normally distributed variables, part of factors A, B and C, means adjusted 
for covariates age, IQ and sex
Dependent variables Autism Spectrum Disorder
Mean         SD
Personality disorder   p (df=1)               
Mean          SD
a) ability to read and regulate emotions:  
emotional experiential (mSceit) 96.81              14.78 92.22          13.79        .16
B) self-estimate of ability to read and regulate 
emotions: 
interpersonal  (eQ-i) 
identifying em.  (BVaQ)
77.35             19.49
22.00             7.13
94.19         17.39         .001*
23.37          7.94          .50
c) self-estimate of intrapersonal functioning:
intrapersonal functioning
adaptation (both eQ-i)
75.37             15.72
74.34             16.79
67.30          18.87        .05
77.48          16.89        .41
Notes: 
-*= significant result on base of False Discovery Rate, BY method, k=34, p < .012 (Due to the 34 statistical tests that were done, the p-level 
was adjusted using a False Discovery Rate adjusted p-level of 0.01214 (Narum, 2006)).
- For factor A, an ANOVA analysis was conducted; for factors B and C MANOVA’s were conducted.
Table 5. Analyses on normally distributed variables, part of domains A, B and C 
Dependent variables Diagnosis (ASD and PD)
F                         p           es 
Covariate sex
 F           p          es
Covariate age
F          p            es
Covariate IQ
F            p              es




(1,109) = 2.00   .16           .02  .16       .69        .001 5.97      .02        .05 9.83        <.01*     .08
higher iQ better 
functioning
B) self-estimate of ability to 
read and regulate emotions: 
interpersonal  (eQ-i) 
identifying em.  (BVaQ)
(2,88) = 9.4       <.001*     .18
(1,89) = 12.30    .001*      .12
aSd report worse functioning than pd
(1,89) = .45        .50          .01
 .82         .45        .02
1.43        .24        .02
.02         .90         .00
2.72     .07         .06
4.55     .04         .05
3.42     .07         .04
1.11        .33          .03
.51          .48          .01
.71          .40          .01




(2,108) = 5.89    <.01*      .10
aSd report better intra funct.than pd
(1,109) = 3.91    .05         .04 
(1,109) = .693    .41         .01
3.73       .03         .07
.49          .49        .004
6.06        .02        .05
3.81     .03         .07
1.23       .27       .01
7.00     <.01*     .06
2.80        .07          .05
4.93        .03          .04
4.41        .04         .04 
Notes: 
-* = Significant result; False Discovery Rate BY method, k = 34, p < .012. Es = effect size partial eta squared (due to the 34 statistical tests 
that were done, the p-level was adjusted using a False Discovery Rate adjusted p-level of 0.01214 (Narum, 2006))
-For factor A, an ANOVA analysis was conducted; for factors B and C MANOVA’s were conducted
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the stated hypotheses. 
as to the negativity bias hypothesis (domes et al. 
2009, Lynch et al. 2006), this was confirmed for the 
intrapersonal part, patients with pd reporting their 
intrapersonal functioning as more impaired. this 
result fits the earlier mentioned PD sensitivity for a 
negative cognitive bias in (primarily) the perception 
of self. Consequently, when one is tended to reflect 
negatively on own functioning, one may feel less 
control to participate in daily life, which can also lower 
one’s well being (lefcourt 1982, Seifer et al. 1992). 
in accordance with this, arntz et al. (2011) describe 
a tendency in Borderline, avoidant and dependent 
pd patients to criticize themselves and have negative 
emotional responses combined with low solution-
focused strategies, influencing emotion regulation as 
well (also mentioned in e.g., dijke et al. 2010, Johnson 
et al. 2003). patients with aSd indicate themselves as 
impaired in interpersonal functioning, but their overall 
well-being does not get influenced so thoroughly as 
in pd. explanatory, patients with aSd may be less 
emotionalising, but more cognitively reflective on 
discussion
The present study is one of the first that aims to 
contribute to differential diagnosis of autism Spectrum 
disorders and personality disorders (disorders 
having phenomenological overlap), by measuring 
social cognition. results show that patients with aSd 
estimate themselves as more impaired than patients 
with pd on reading emotions, whereas patients with pd 
report themselves as more impaired on intrapersonal 
functioning. patients with aSd and patients with pd do 
not differ in their ability to read and regulate emotions 
and both groups report more impairment on aspects of 
social cognition on a self-report measure and on a part 
of an ability measure, as compared to non-patient data. 
furthermore, aSd and pd subtyping (autistic disorder, 
asperger’s disorder, pdd-noS, pd clusters a, B and 
C) does not lead to distinguishable findings. This latter 
finding fits the subdividing discussion as mentioned 
in other studies (e.g. for aSd: Witwer and lecavalier 
2008, for pd: Westen and Shedler 1999). 
the results implicate the following with respect to 
Table 7. Ordinal regression analysis with variables (part of factors A, B and C, not normally distributed), PLUM
Dependent variables Diagnosis (ASD and PD)
Estimate   Wald     p
Covariate sex
 Est    Wald     p
Covariate age
Est    Wald    p
Covariate IQ       df=1
Est   Wald      p




-.23            .32         .57
.93             4.45       .04
-.91     4.02      .05
.40      .70        .40
-.10     41.25   < .001*  
.03      3.29      .07
.07    17.23     < .001*
-.04   5.85       .02 
B) self-estimate of ability to 
read and regulate emotions: 
Verbalising  (BVaQ) 
emotionalising (BVaQ)
analysing (BVaQ)
.94             3.97       .05
.99             4.38       .04 
.59             1.60       .21
 
.84      2.81      .09
-.105  4.31       .04
-.27     .29        .59
.02      2.50      .11   
.01      .96        .33
.03      3.28      .07
.002  .02         .89
.007  .14         .71
-.01   .10         .76
c) self-estimate of intrapersonal 
functioning:
Stress management (eQ-i) 
mood (eQ-i)
.13             .09         .76
.59             2.06       .15
-.60    1.75       .19
-.24     .28        .60
-.05     11.46    .001*
-.01     .11        .74
.03    3.24       .07
.02    .89         .35
Note: 
-* = Significant result; False Discovery Rate BY method, k = 34, p < .012. Es = effect size partial eta squared (due to the 34 statistical tests 
that were done, the p-level was adjusted using a False Discovery Rate adjusted p-level of 0.01214 (Narum, 2006))
Table 6. Descriptive statistics not normally distributed variables, part of factors A, B and C
Dependent variables Autism Spectrum Disorder
Median        Quartiles        
Personality disorder                                          
Median          Quartiles
a) ability to read and regulate emotions: emotional 
Strategic (mSceit)
failure score (SSt)                                                         
87.48               82.61-94.96
  1.00               0.00-5.00                     
85.98          80.46-93.22 
1.00            0.00-2.00
B) self-estimate of ability to read and regulate 
emotions: Verbalising (BVaQ)
emotionalising (BVaQ)
analysing (BVaQ)                                              
31.00               23.50-35.00
22.00               16.75-27.00 
20.50               13.75-27.00 
28.00          19.00-34.75
16.50          13.00-19.75
17.00          12.00-23.00
c) self-estimate of intrapersonal functioning: 
Stress management (eQi)
mood (eQ-i)
87.00               76.00-98.00
77.00               66.00-93.00
85.00          70.00-93.00 
66.00          58.00-85.00
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as mentioned before, the diagnostic knowledge 
that both the aSd and pd group are vulnerable in 
social cognition has therapeutic implications as well. 
While aSd is generally seen as a chronic disorder and 
therapeutic interventions are mostly focused on care 
(e.g. Vermeulen 2005), pd is currently seen as relatively 
more open to change, and therapies are successfully 
focused on cure, striving for healthier ways of 
regulating emotions and social interactions (e.g. young 
et al. 2003). it would be challenging to speculate about 
aSd as having changeable social cognitive aspects as 
well; studies involving emotion recognition and theory 
of mind training are promising (e.g. ozonoff and miller 
1995, Williams et al. 2012, Vissers and honée-van Zijll 
de Jong in preparation). 
With regard to limitations of our study; looking 
back, it might have been contributing to include a 
hetero-anamnestic (developmental) interview in the 
comparison between aSd and pd. Whereas this 
measure is custom for aSd diagnostic practice, it is not 
for pd diagnostic practice. in future research, social 
cognition aspects as present within the biographical 
information, could also have contributing worth in 
differentiating between aSd and pd. furthermore, 
although all patient files were checked by Lead-method, 
a more thorough overview of the detailed content and 
quality of diagnostic measures that were undertaken 
in the patient groups (prior to this study) would have 
been more precise. perhaps, comparing various pd’s 
could have shown differences in performance on social 
cognition, but due to lesser n sizes per pd we chose to 
compare clusters (see method). Nevertheless, firstly, the 
n sizes do, given an official administrative search, show 
a realistic representation of cluster diagnoses in our 
clinical practice. Secondly, in line with the dimensional 
future of dSm, estimating degrees of impairment may 
have more worth, than subdividing disorders. With 
regard to types of tests (ability measurement by mSceit 
versus self-report measurement by eQ-i), it shows that 
ability and self-report measures lead to different results. 
in other words: a negative self-reporting tendency does 
not automatically relate to worse functioning on actual 
capacities.  These findings are supported by several 
other studies, and it makes the evaluation of which 
kind of tests to use important, depending on study aims 
(Beblo et al 2010, hertel et al. 2009, leible and Snell 
2004, peter et al. 2013). against the background of 
the emotionalising reflection impairment-hypothesis, 
one could be tended to state that self-report measures 
are less suitable for patients with aSd. contrary, as 
earlier mentioned, patients with aSd are shown to be 
able to give a realistic estimation of own functioning on 
self-report scales, as compared to estimations by their 
family context (ozonoff et al. 2005). further research 
is needed to test this statement. furthermore, one could 
state that the EQ-i and MSCEIT do not specifically 
measure social cognition, but rather measure aspects 
like emotion (regulation), that is linked to the social 
cognition process. nevertheless, the amount of overlap 
between these constructs is not sufficiently clear yet, as 
a consequence of which conclusions should be taken 
cautiously. Both patient groups do show impaired 
functioning on the emotion regulation ability mSceit 
scale, as compared to non-patient data. this construct 
was not thoroughly measured in the present study, 
but, investigating the (socio-emotional) negativity 
bias in patients with pd, could lead to greater insight 
in (differentiation between) the neuropsychological 
profiles in ASD and PD. In future research experientially 
based emotion regulation tasks should be developed 
and performed (p. e. emotion induction tasks).   
own functioning than patients with pd. consequently, 
the confrontation with functional impairments may 
lead to a lesser amount of “emotional insight and/or 
suffering” in aSd. nevertheless, the negativity bias in 
pd is just one possible explanation for their scores on 
these measures. it does call for further research on this 
part, in addition to a deeper view on the differentiation 
between emotionalising and cognitive parts of emotion 
perception, regulation and its influence on patient 
responses.
the social cognitive ability hypothesis, expecting 
patients with aSd to function more impaired than 
patients with pd on reading and regulating emotions, 
was not confirmed. The finding that there are no 
differences between aSd and pd on social cognitive 
ability measures also provides a limitation for our 
study; one could say that both patients with aSd and 
pd have problems in reading and regulating emotions, 
but one still cannot say if these problems are similar 
in its specific nature and causes. That is, focusing on 
the social cognitive ability function as operationalized 
by the selected tasks we used, may not sensitively have 
measured detailed subdivisions in social cognitive 
abilities and/or specific key impairments. Furthermore, 
within the stated hypothesis, no differentiation was 
made between emotionalising and more cognitive 
aspects of social cognition. consequently, when aiming 
to focus on a broad construct like social cognition to 
differentiate between disorders, awareness concerning 
the sensitivity of selected tasks to pick up detailed 
differences between groups is important and needs 
more research. It also suggests that findings need 
to be embedded within a more detailed, tailored 
profile of strengths and weaknesses, that forms an 
(dimensional) overview of psychopathology and 
primarily gives information concerning the specific 
accents and intensity of impairments. furthermore, 
bio-physiological measures like eeg/mri measures 
would give an even deeper and detailed look under the 
behavioural level than the tasks we performed in the 
present study; electrophysiology is thereby an important 
technique for future research.  
the hypothesis that patients with aSd and pd 
estimate themselves as more impaired on social 
cognition and actually function worse on part of an 
ability measure than controls is confirmed. For both 
ASD and PD, keeping in mind earlier literature findings 
from the introduction concerning interpersonal, 
intrapersonal functioning and emotion regulation this 
fits the expectations. The knowledge that patients with 
pd show problems on both, though not all self-report 
and ability measurements, sheds an additional light 
on the earlier mentioned negativity bias hypothesis. 
patients with pd have a negative estimate of own 
social cognitive functioning, but they actually do 
have impairments in emotion regulation. one could 
state that, these results indicate that patients with pd 
have a realistic view of own vulnerabilities instead of 
a negativity bias. nevertheless, these results do not 
rule out the negativity bias either; they could fit the 
interplay between (social) cognition and emotion in the 
same model, as described earlier by izard (2009). in 
other words, having negative cognitions can influence 
one’s functioning on -social cognitive- emotional 
ability measures, but the functioning on emotionally 
laden measures (as a stimulus) in turn can influence 
the negative cognitions as well. this implicates self-
report and ability measures can give insight in the 
nature and intensity of impairments in aSd and pd, 
but it definitely does not give (and is not meant to give) 
a linear way of explanatory understanding.
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psychodiagnostics nijmegen for providing the control 
data and to ms. dymphie mioch, mSc, and gerjanne 
trompert, mSc, for test administration and scoring.
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in addition to the earlier mentioned limitations of 
our study, we also realise that the present effect sizes 
are fairly small. furthermore, the missing values on 
certain measures (BVaQ, see method), made our n 
sizes fluctuate over analyses, which interferes with the 
power of statistical tests. in addition, the lack of iQ data 
in the aSd-controls and pd-controls comparison is a 
limitation, mostly because IQ may have influenced the 
differences found in these comparisons and it could have 
been taken into account as a covariate.  lastly, in future 
research we’ll strive for the collection of own control 
data, for all the measures conducted.    concluding, 
neurocognition contributes to insight into the 
phenomenology of disorders by putting a deeper look, in 
addition to the topographical behaviour viewpoint. that 
is, by mapping part of the relation between brain and 
behaviour. as mentioned, the use of electrophysiology 
is a recommendation for future research, in order to 
gain an even deeper detailed look under the surface. 
nevertheless, measuring neurocognitive functioning 
seems highly relevant, provided that it is embedded 
within a detailed and primarily dimensional profiling 
of strengths and weaknesses, combining all three 
levels of brain, cognition and behaviour. measuring 
social cognition as performed in the present study, 
does give insight in functioning of patients with aSd 
and patients with pd. however, it needs embedding 
within more detailed profiling. Furthermore, hetero-
anamnestic information concerning development 
throughout the life-span is needed. in other words, 
social cognition needs to be measured along with 
these other diagnostic steps, to be able to contribute 
to differentiating the disorders. for social cognition, 
it seems particularly useful to look at self-report 
measures. these can shed light on one’s participation 
in social life tasks and quality of life, thereby touching 
possible treatment strategies in a tailored way. for 
example, focusing on self-actualization behaviour 
and a more healthy strategy in emotionalising may 
improve the intrapersonal functioning of patients with 
pd, while focusing on empathic perspective taking (for 
example, by deictic framing training, tom training as 
well as emotion recognition training (e.g., Janssen et al. 
2014, ozonoff and miller 1995, Williams et al. 2012, 
Vissers and honée-van Zijll de Jong in preparation) 
may improve interpersonal functioning of patients with 
aSd. these diagnostic and treatment strategies can in 
turn lead to insight and understanding in patients, which 
can influence their in-control thoughts, needed for a 
more healthy quality of life. furthermore, focusing on 
a detailed neurocognitive strengths and weaknesses 
profile seems to transcend the relevance of subdividing 
disorders like several aSd’s and pd’s. in order to form 
this detailed profile, the tasks as used within the present 
study can be of help to a clinician, concerning the aspect 
of social cognitive functioning. furthermore, patient’s 
own estimates of their functioning and suffering areas 
as measured by the eQ-i can provide therapeutic 
entrances. Nevertheless, current findings do call for 
further research, to explore further whether aSd and 
pd differences are indeed associated with accents in 
emotionalising versus cognitive reflection and abilities, 
a negativity bias, and/or (out of) control-thoughts.  
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